// file : mod/mod-ci-github.cxx -*- C++ -*- // license : MIT; see accompanying LICENSE file #include #include #include #include // mime_url_encode() #include #include #include // build_log_url() #include #include #include #include #include // @@ Remaining TODOs // // - Rerequested checks // // - check_suite (action: rerequested): received when user re-runs all // checks. // // - check_run (action: rerequested): received when user re-runs a // specific check or all failed checks. // // Will need to extract a few more fields from check_runs, but the layout // is very similar to that of check_suite. // // - Pull requests. Handle // // - Choose strong webhook secret (when deploying). // // - Check that delivery UUID has not been received before (replay attack). // // Resources: // // Creating an App: // https://docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/about-creating-github-apps/best-practices-for-creating-a-github-app // // Webhooks: // https://docs.github.com/en/webhooks/using-webhooks/best-practices-for-using-webhooks // https://docs.github.com/en/webhooks/using-webhooks/validating-webhook-deliveries // // REST API: // All docs: https://docs.github.com/en/rest#all-docs // Best practices: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/using-the-rest-api/best-practices-for-using-the-rest-api // // GraphQL API: // Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/graphql/reference // using namespace std; using namespace butl; using namespace web; using namespace brep::cli; namespace brep { ci_github:: ci_github (tenant_service_map& tsm) : tenant_service_map_ (tsm) { } ci_github:: ci_github (const ci_github& r, tenant_service_map& tsm) : database_module (r), ci_start (r), options_ (r.initialized_ ? r.options_ : nullptr), tenant_service_map_ (tsm) { } void ci_github:: init (scanner& s) { { shared_ptr ts ( dynamic_pointer_cast (shared_from_this ())); assert (ts != nullptr); // By definition. tenant_service_map_["ci-github"] = move (ts); } options_ = make_shared ( s, unknown_mode::fail, unknown_mode::fail); // Prepare for the CI requests handling, if configured. // if (options_->build_config_specified () && options_->ci_github_app_webhook_secret_specified ()) { ci_start::init (make_shared (*options_)); database_module::init (*options_, options_->build_db_retry ()); } } bool ci_github:: handle (request& rq, response&) { using namespace bpkg; HANDLER_DIAG; if (build_db_ == nullptr) throw invalid_request (501, "GitHub CI submission not implemented"); // Process headers. // string event; // Webhook event. string hmac; // Received HMAC. try { bool content_type (false); for (const name_value& h: rq.headers ()) { // HMAC authenticating this request. Note that it won't be present // unless a webhook secret has been set in the GitHub app's settings. // if (icasecmp (h.name, "x-hub-signature-256") == 0) { if (!h.value) throw invalid_request (400, "missing x-hub-signature-256 value"); // Parse the x-hub-signature-256 header value. For example: // // sha256=5e82258... // // Check for the presence of the "sha256=" prefix and then strip it // to leave only the HMAC value. // if (h.value->find ("sha256=", 0, 7) == string::npos) throw invalid_request (400, "invalid x-hub-signature-256 value"); hmac = h.value->substr (7); } // This event's UUID. // else if (icasecmp (h.name, "x-github-delivery") == 0) { // @@ TODO Check that delivery UUID has not been received before // (replay attack). } else if (icasecmp (h.name, "content-type") == 0) { if (!h.value) throw invalid_request (400, "missing content-type value"); if (icasecmp (*h.value, "application/json") != 0) { throw invalid_request (400, "invalid content-type value: '" + *h.value + '\''); } content_type = true; } // The webhook event. // else if (icasecmp (h.name, "x-github-event") == 0) { if (!h.value) throw invalid_request (400, "missing x-github-event value"); event = *h.value; } } if (!content_type) throw invalid_request (400, "missing content-type header"); if (event.empty ()) throw invalid_request (400, "missing x-github-event header"); if (hmac.empty ()) throw invalid_request (400, "missing x-hub-signature-256 header"); } catch (const invalid_request& e) { error << "request header error: " << e.content; throw; } // Read the entire request body into a buffer because we need to compute // an HMAC over it and then parse it as JSON. The alternative of reading // from the stream twice works out to be more complicated (see also a TODO // item in web/server/module.hxx). // string body; { // Note that even though we may not need caching right now, we may later // (e.g., to support cancel) so let's just enable it right away. // size_t limit (128 * 1024); istream& is (rq.content (limit, limit)); try { getline (is, body, '\0'); } catch (const io_error& e) { fail << "unable to read request body: " << e; } } // Verify the received HMAC. // // Compute the HMAC value over the request body using the configured // webhook secret as key and compare it to the received HMAC. // try { string h ( compute_hmac (*options_, body.data (), body.size (), options_->ci_github_app_webhook_secret ().c_str ())); if (!icasecmp (h, hmac)) { string m ("computed HMAC does not match received HMAC"); error << m; throw invalid_request (400, move (m)); } } catch (const system_error& e) { fail << "unable to compute request HMAC: " << e; } // Process the `warning` webhook request query parameter. // bool warning_success; { const name_values& rps (rq.parameters (1024, true /* url_only */)); auto i (find_if (rps.begin (), rps.end (), [] (auto&& rp) {return rp.name == "warning";})); if (i == rps.end ()) throw invalid_request (400, "missing 'warning' webhook query parameter"); if (!i->value) throw invalid_request ( 400, "missing 'warning' webhook query parameter value"); const string& v (*i->value); if (v == "success") warning_success = true; else if (v == "failure") warning_success = false; else { throw invalid_request ( 400, "invalid 'warning' webhook query parameter value: '" + v + '\''); } } // There is a webhook event (specified in the x-github-event header) and // each event contains a bunch of actions (specified in the JSON request // body). // // Note: "GitHub continues to add new event types and new actions to // existing event types." As a result we ignore known actions that we are // not interested in and log and ignore unknown actions. The thinking here // is that we want be "notified" of new actions at which point we can decide // whether to ignore them or to handle. // // @@ There is also check_run even (re-requested by user, either // individual check run or all the failed check runs). // // @@ There is also the pull_request event. Probably need to handle. // if (event == "check_suite") { gh_check_suite_event cs; try { json::parser p (body.data (), body.size (), "check_suite event"); cs = gh_check_suite_event (p); } catch (const json::invalid_json_input& e) { string m ("malformed JSON in " + e.name + " request body"); error << m << ", line: " << e.line << ", column: " << e.column << ", byte offset: " << e.position << ", error: " << e; throw invalid_request (400, move (m)); } if (cs.action == "requested") { return handle_check_suite_request (move (cs), warning_success); } else if (cs.action == "rerequested") { // Someone manually requested to re-run the check runs in this check // suite. Treat as a new request. // // @@ This is probably broken. // return handle_check_suite_request (move (cs), warning_success); } else if (cs.action == "completed") { // GitHub thinks that "all the check runs in this check suite have // completed and a conclusion is available". Looks like this one we // ignore? // // What if our bookkeeping says otherwise? But then we can't even // access the service data easily here. @@ TODO: maybe/later. // return true; } else { // Ignore unknown actions by sending a 200 response with empty body // but also log as an error since we want to notice new actions. // error << "unknown action '" << cs.action << "' in check_suite event"; return true; } } // else if (event == "pull_request") // { // return handle_pull_request (); // } else { // Log to investigate. // error << "unexpected event '" << event << "'"; throw invalid_request (400, "unexpected event: '" + event + "'"); } } bool ci_github:: handle_check_suite_request (gh_check_suite_event cs, bool warning_success) { HANDLER_DIAG; l3 ([&]{trace << "check_suite event { " << cs << " }";}); optional jwt (generate_jwt (trace, error)); if (!jwt) throw server_error (); optional iat ( obtain_installation_access_token (cs.installation.id, move (*jwt), error)); if (!iat) throw server_error (); l3 ([&]{trace << "installation_access_token { " << *iat << " }";}); // Submit the CI request. // repository_location rl (cs.repository.clone_url + '#' + cs.check_suite.head_branch, repository_type::git); string sd (service_data (warning_success, move (iat->token), iat->expires_at, cs.installation.id, move (cs.repository.node_id), move (cs.check_suite.head_sha)) .json ()); // @@ What happens if we call this functions with an already existing // node_id (e.g., replay attack). See the UUID header above. // optional r ( start (error, warn, verb_ ? &trace : nullptr, tenant_service (move (cs.check_suite.node_id), "ci-github", move (sd)), move (rl), vector {}, nullopt, /* client_ip */ nullopt /* user_agent */)); if (!r) fail << "unable to submit CI request"; return true; } // High-level description of PR handling: // // - CI the merge commit but add checks to PR head ref // // Recommended by the following blog posts by a GitHub employee who is one // of the best sources on these topics: // https://www.kenmuse.com/blog/shared-commits-and-github-checks/ and // https://www.kenmuse.com/blog/creating-github-checks/. // // DO NOT ADD CHECKS TO THE MERGE COMMIT because: // // - The PR head ref is the only commit that can be relied upon to exist // throughout the PR's lifetime. The merge commit, on the other hand, // can get replaced during the PR process. When that happens the PR will // look for checks on the new merge commit, effectively discarding the // ones we had before. // // - Although some of the GitHub documentation makes it sound like they // expect checks to be added to both the PR head and the merge commit, // the PR UI does not react to the merge commit's checks // consistently. It actually seems to be quite broken. // // The only thing it seems to do reliably is blocking the PR merge if // the merge commit is not successful (overriding the PR head ref's // checks). But the UI looks quite messed up generally in this state. // // - PR Creation // // False green window problem // - User creates new commit on feature branch // - We receive check_suite; check runs start, run, succeed // - User creates PR from feature branch to master // - Because feature branch head has successful CRs, PR is green to merge // - But merge commit has not been CI'd yet // - False green until first merge commit CR is queued // // check_suite(requested, PR_head): [shared repo model] // // - Starts CI with check runs on what will become the PR head ref // // pull_request(opened) // // - Fetch pull request to trigger start of merge commit job; ignore // response // // - To close false green window // - if pull_request.head.repo.node_id == pull_request.base.repo.node_id // - Replace all (or just one?) of the CRs on the PR head ref with new, // queued ones // - Fetch all check runs on PR head SHA // - Find CRs with this PR in pull_requests[] // - Create new CRs with same names as existing, thus effectively // destroying the old ones // // - Create unloaded tenant // // - On callback // Fetch pull request; if mergeable, start CI proper // // - New commits are added to PR head branch // // False green window // // PR already exists so merge will be red initially after CS is // received, but those CRs could theoretically all succeed before our CI // of the merge commit starts. Either way the CS CRs are an inaccurate // representation of what's being CI'd so need to be avoided if // possible. // // check_suite(requested, PR_head) [shared repo model] // // Ignore if pull_requests[] is non-empty (which should be the case if // the head branch is in the same repository). // // pull_request(synchronize) // // - Fetch pull request to trigger start of merge commit job; ignore // response // // - Create unloaded tenant // // - On callback // Fetch pull request; if mergeable, start CI proper // // - New commits are added to PR base branch // // check_suite(requested, PR_base) // // Fetch all open PRs for base branch (triggering the merge commit jobs) // // Replace CRs on PR head refs to close false green window. // // Submit new unloaded tenants for all of the PRs. // // NOTE: pull_request.base.sha does not change. But merge commit (once // updated) does try to merge PR head to new tip of PR base. // // - PR closed/merged/etc. @@ TODO // // pull_request(closed/merged/...) // // Note: when a PR is merged we will get a pull_request(closed) and then a // check_suite for the base branch. // // bool ci_github:: // handle_pull_request (gh_pull_request_event pr) // { // // Fetch pull request in order to start job creating test merge // // commit. Discard result. // // // // Start unloaded CI job. // } // Build state change notifications (see tenant-services.hxx for // background). Mapping our state transitions to GitHub pose multiple // problems: // // 1. In our model we have the building->queued (interrupted) and // built->queued (rebuild) transitions. We are going to ignore both of // them when notifying GitHub. The first is not important (we expect the // state to go back to building shortly). The second should normally not // happen and would mean that a completed check suite may go back on its // conclusion (which would be pretty confusing for the user). // // So, for GitHub notifications, we only have the following linear // transition sequence: // // -> queued -> building -> built // // Note, however, that because we ignore certain transitions, we can now // observe "degenerate" state changes that we need to ignore: // // building -> [queued] -> building // built -> [queued] -> ... // // 2. As mentioned in tenant-services.hxx, we may observe the notifications // as arriving in the wrong order. Unfortunately, GitHub provides no // mechanisms to help with that. In fact, GitHub does not even prevent // the creation of multiple check runs with the same name (it will always // use the last created instance, regardless of the status, timestamps, // etc). As a result, we cannot, for example, rely on the failure to // create a new check run in response to the queued notification as an // indication of a subsequent notification (e.g., building) having // already occurred. // // The only aid in this area that GitHub provides is that it prevents // updating a check run in the built state to a former state (queued or // building). But one can still create a new check run with the same name // and a former state. // // (Note that we should also be careful if trying to take advantage of // this "check run override" semantics: each created check run gets a new // URL and while the GitHub UI will always point to the last created when // showing the list of check runs, if the user is already on the previous // check run's URL, nothing will automatically cause them to be // redirected to the new URL. And so the user may sit on the abandoned // check run waiting forever for it to be completed.) // // As a result, we will deal with the out of order problem differently // depending on the notification: // // queued Skip if there is already a check run in service data, // otherwise create new. // // building Skip if there is no check run in service data or it's // not in the queued state, otherwise update. // // built Update if there is check run in service data unless its // state is built, otherwise create new. // // The rationale for this semantics is as follows: the building // notification is a "nice to have" and can be skipped if things are not // going normally. In contrast, the built notification cannot be skipped // and we must either update the existing check run or create a new one // (hopefully overriding the one created previously, if any). Note that // the likelihood of the built notification being performed at the same // time as queued/building is quite low (unlike queued and building). // // Note also that with this semantics it's unlikely but possible that we // attempt to update the service data in the wrong order. Specifically, it // feels like this should not be possible in the ->building transition // since we skip the building notification unless the check run in the // service data is already in the queued state. But it is theoretically // possible in the ->built transition. For example, we may be updating // the service data for the queued notification after it has already been // updated by the built notification. In such cases we should not be // overriding the latter state (built) with the former (queued). // // 3. We may not be able to "conclusively" notify GitHub, for example, due // to a transient network error. The "conclusively" part means that the // notification may or may not have gone through (though it feels the // common case will be the inability to send the request rather than // receive the reply). // // In such cases, we record in the service data that the notification was // not synchronized and in subsequent notifications we do the best we can: // if we have node_id, then we update, otherwise, we create (potentially // overriding the check run created previously). // function (const tenant_service&)> ci_github:: build_queued (const tenant_service& ts, const vector& builds, optional istate, const build_queued_hints& hs, const diag_epilogue& log_writer) const noexcept { NOTIFICATION_DIAG (log_writer); service_data sd; try { sd = service_data (*ts.data); } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "failed to parse service data: " << e; return nullptr; } // The builds for which we will be creating check runs. // vector> bs; vector crs; // Parallel to bs. // Exclude the builds for which we won't be creating check runs. // for (const build& b: builds) { string bid (gh_check_run_name (b)); // Full build ID. if (const check_run* scr = sd.find_check_run (bid)) { // Another notification has already stored this check run. // if (!istate) { // Out of order queued notification. // warn << "check run " << bid << ": out of order queued " << "notification; existing state: " << scr->state_string (); } else if (*istate == build_state::built) { // Unexpected built->queued transition (rebuild). // warn << "check run " << bid << ": unexpected rebuild"; } else { // Ignore interrupted. } } else { // No stored check run for this build so prepare to create one. // bs.push_back (b); crs.emplace_back (move (bid), gh_check_run_name (b, &hs), nullopt, /* node_id */ build_state::queued, false /* state_synced */); } } if (bs.empty ()) // Nothing to do. return nullptr; // Get a new installation access token if the current one has expired. // const gh_installation_access_token* iat (nullptr); optional new_iat; if (system_clock::now () > sd.installation_access.expires_at) { if (optional jwt = generate_jwt (trace, error)) { new_iat = obtain_installation_access_token (sd.installation_id, move (*jwt), error); if (new_iat) iat = &*new_iat; } } else iat = &sd.installation_access; // Note: we treat the failure to obtain the installation access token the // same as the failure to notify GitHub (state is updated by not marked // synced). // if (iat != nullptr) { // Create a check_run for each build. // if (gq_create_check_runs (error, crs, iat->token, sd.repository_node_id, sd.head_sha, build_state::queued)) { for (const check_run& cr: crs) { assert (cr.state == build_state::queued); l3 ([&]{trace << "created check_run { " << cr << " }";}); } } } return [bs = move (bs), iat = move (new_iat), crs = move (crs), error = move (error), warn = move (warn)] (const tenant_service& ts) -> optional { // NOTE: this lambda may be called repeatedly (e.g., due to transaction // being aborted) and so should not move out of its captures. service_data sd; try { sd = service_data (*ts.data); } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "failed to parse service data: " << e; return nullopt; } if (iat) sd.installation_access = *iat; for (size_t i (0); i != bs.size (); ++i) { const check_run& cr (crs[i]); // Note that this service data may not be the same as what we observed // in the build_queued() function above. For example, some check runs // that we have queued may have already transitioned to built. So we // skip any check runs that are already present. // if (const check_run* scr = sd.find_check_run (cr.build_id)) { // Doesn't looks like printing new/existing check run node_id will // be of any help. // warn << "check run " << cr.build_id << ": out of order queued " << "notification service data update; existing state: " << scr->state_string (); } else sd.check_runs.push_back (cr); } return sd.json (); }; } function (const tenant_service&)> ci_github:: build_building (const tenant_service& ts, const build& b, const diag_epilogue& log_writer) const noexcept { NOTIFICATION_DIAG (log_writer); service_data sd; try { sd = service_data (*ts.data); } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "failed to parse service data: " << e; return nullptr; } optional cr; // Updated check run. string bid (gh_check_run_name (b)); // Full Build ID. if (check_run* scr = sd.find_check_run (bid)) // Stored check run. { // Update the check run if it exists on GitHub and the queued // notification succeeded and updated the service data, otherwise do // nothing. // if (scr->state == build_state::queued) { if (scr->node_id) { cr = move (*scr); cr->state_synced = false; } else { // Network error during queued notification, ignore. } } else warn << "check run " << bid << ": out of order building " << "notification; existing state: " << scr->state_string (); } else warn << "check run " << bid << ": out of order building " << "notification; no check run state in service data"; if (!cr) return nullptr; // Get a new installation access token if the current one has expired. // const gh_installation_access_token* iat (nullptr); optional new_iat; if (system_clock::now () > sd.installation_access.expires_at) { if (optional jwt = generate_jwt (trace, error)) { new_iat = obtain_installation_access_token (sd.installation_id, move (*jwt), error); if (new_iat) iat = &*new_iat; } } else iat = &sd.installation_access; // Note: we treat the failure to obtain the installation access token the // same as the failure to notify GitHub (state is updated but not marked // synced). // if (iat != nullptr) { if (gq_update_check_run (error, *cr, iat->token, sd.repository_node_id, *cr->node_id, details_url (b), build_state::building)) { // Do nothing further if the state was already built on GitHub (note // that this is based on the above-mentioned special GitHub semantics // of preventing changes to the built status). // if (cr->state == build_state::built) { warn << "check run " << bid << ": already in built state on GitHub"; return nullptr; } assert (cr->state == build_state::building); l3 ([&]{trace << "updated check_run { " << *cr << " }";}); } } return [iat = move (new_iat), cr = move (*cr), error = move (error), warn = move (warn)] (const tenant_service& ts) -> optional { // NOTE: this lambda may be called repeatedly (e.g., due to transaction // being aborted) and so should not move out of its captures. service_data sd; try { sd = service_data (*ts.data); } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "failed to parse service data: " << e; return nullopt; } if (iat) sd.installation_access = *iat; // Update the check run only if it is in the queued state. // if (check_run* scr = sd.find_check_run (cr.build_id)) { if (scr->state == build_state::queued) *scr = cr; else { warn << "check run " << cr.build_id << ": out of order building " << "notification service data update; existing state: " << scr->state_string (); } } else warn << "check run " << cr.build_id << ": service data state has " << "disappeared"; return sd.json (); }; } function (const tenant_service&)> ci_github:: build_built (const tenant_service& ts, const build& b, const diag_epilogue& log_writer) const noexcept { NOTIFICATION_DIAG (log_writer); service_data sd; try { sd = service_data (*ts.data); } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "failed to parse service data: " << e; return nullptr; } check_run cr; // Updated check run. { string bid (gh_check_run_name (b)); // Full Build ID. if (check_run* scr = sd.find_check_run (bid)) { if (scr->state != build_state::building) { warn << "check run " << bid << ": out of order built notification; " << "existing state: " << scr->state_string (); } // Do nothing if already built (e.g., rebuild). // if (scr->state == build_state::built) return nullptr; cr = move (*scr); } else { warn << "check run " << bid << ": out of order built notification; " << "no check run state in service data"; cr.build_id = move (bid); cr.name = cr.build_id; } cr.state_synced = false; } // Get a new installation access token if the current one has expired. // const gh_installation_access_token* iat (nullptr); optional new_iat; if (system_clock::now () > sd.installation_access.expires_at) { if (optional jwt = generate_jwt (trace, error)) { new_iat = obtain_installation_access_token (sd.installation_id, move (*jwt), error); if (new_iat) iat = &*new_iat; } } else iat = &sd.installation_access; // Note: we treat the failure to obtain the installation access token the // same as the failure to notify GitHub (state is updated but not marked // synced). // if (iat != nullptr) { // Return the colored circle corresponding to a result_status. // auto circle = [] (result_status rs) -> string { switch (rs) { case result_status::success: return "\U0001F7E2"; // Green circle. case result_status::warning: return "\U0001F7E0"; // Orange circle. case result_status::error: case result_status::abort: case result_status::abnormal: return "\U0001F534"; // Red circle. // Valid values we should never encounter. // case result_status::skip: case result_status::interrupt: throw invalid_argument ("unexpected result_status value: " + to_string (rs)); } return ""; // Should never reach. }; // Prepare the check run's summary field (the build information in an // XHTML table). // string sm; // Summary. { using namespace web::xhtml; ostringstream os; xml::serializer s (os, "check_run_summary"); // This hack is required to disable XML element name prefixes (which // GitHub does not like). Note that this adds an xmlns declaration for // the XHTML namespace which for now GitHub appears to ignore. If that // ever becomes a problem, then we should redo this with raw XML // serializer calls. // struct table: element { table (): element ("table") {} void start (xml::serializer& s) const override { s.start_element (xmlns, name); s.namespace_decl (xmlns, ""); } } TABLE; // Serialize a result row (colored circle, result text, log URL) for // an operation and result_status. // auto tr_result = [this, circle, &b] (xml::serializer& s, const string& op, result_status rs) { // The log URL. // string lu (build_log_url (options_->host (), options_->root (), b, op != "result" ? &op : nullptr)); s << TR << TD << EM << op << ~EM << ~TD << TD << circle (rs) << ' ' << CODE << to_string (rs) << ~CODE << " (" << A << HREF << lu << ~HREF << "log" << ~A << ')' << ~TD << ~TR; }; // Serialize the summary to an XHTML table. // s << TABLE << TBODY; tr_result (s, "result", *b.status); s << TR << TD << EM << "package" << ~EM << ~TD << TD << CODE << b.package_name << ~CODE << ~TD << ~TR << TR << TD << EM << "version" << ~EM << ~TD << TD << CODE << b.package_version << ~CODE << ~TD << ~TR << TR << TD << EM << "toolchain" << ~EM << ~TD << TD << CODE << b.toolchain_name << '-' << b.toolchain_version.string () << ~CODE << ~TD << ~TR << TR << TD << EM << "target" << ~EM << ~TD << TD << CODE << b.target.string () << ~CODE << ~TD << ~TR << TR << TD << EM << "target config" << ~EM << ~TD << TD << CODE << b.target_config_name << ~CODE << ~TD << ~TR << TR << TD << EM << "package config" << ~EM << ~TD << TD << CODE << b.package_config_name << ~CODE << ~TD << ~TR; for (const operation_result& r: b.results) tr_result (s, r.operation, r.status); s << ~TBODY << ~TABLE; sm = os.str (); } gq_built_result br (gh_to_conclusion (*b.status, sd.warning_success), circle (*b.status) + ' ' + ucase (to_string (*b.status)), move (sm)); if (cr.node_id) { // Update existing check run to built. // if (gq_update_check_run (error, cr, iat->token, sd.repository_node_id, *cr.node_id, details_url (b), build_state::built, move (br))) { assert (cr.state == build_state::built); l3 ([&]{trace << "updated check_run { " << cr << " }";}); } } else { // Create new check run. // // Note that we don't have build hints so will be creating this check // run with the full build ID as name. In the unlikely event that an // out of order build_queued() were to run before we've saved this // check run to the service data it will create another check run with // the shortened name which will never get to the built state. // if (gq_create_check_run (error, cr, iat->token, sd.repository_node_id, sd.head_sha, details_url (b), build_state::built, move (br))) { assert (cr.state == build_state::built); l3 ([&]{trace << "created check_run { " << cr << " }";}); } } } return [iat = move (new_iat), cr = move (cr), error = move (error), warn = move (warn)] (const tenant_service& ts) -> optional { // NOTE: this lambda may be called repeatedly (e.g., due to transaction // being aborted) and so should not move out of its captures. service_data sd; try { sd = service_data (*ts.data); } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "failed to parse service data: " << e; return nullopt; } if (iat) sd.installation_access = *iat; if (check_run* scr = sd.find_check_run (cr.build_id)) { // This will most commonly generate a duplicate warning (see above). // We could save the old state and only warn if it differs but let's // not complicate things for now. // #if 0 if (scr->state != build_state::building) { warn << "check run " << cr.build_id << ": out of order built " << "notification service data update; existing state: " << scr->state_string (); } #endif *scr = cr; } else sd.check_runs.push_back (cr); return sd.json (); }; } string ci_github:: details_url (const build& b) const { return options_->host () + "/@" + b.tenant + "?builds=" + mime_url_encode (b.package_name.string ()) + "&pv=" + b.package_version.string () + "&tg=" + mime_url_encode (b.target.string ()) + "&tc=" + mime_url_encode (b.target_config_name) + "&pc=" + mime_url_encode (b.package_config_name) + "&th=" + mime_url_encode (b.toolchain_version.string ()); } optional ci_github:: generate_jwt (const basic_mark& trace, const basic_mark& error) const { string jwt; try { // Set token's "issued at" time 60 seconds in the past to combat clock // drift (as recommended by GitHub). // jwt = brep::generate_jwt ( *options_, options_->ci_github_app_private_key (), to_string (options_->ci_github_app_id ()), chrono::seconds (options_->ci_github_jwt_validity_period ()), chrono::seconds (60)); l3 ([&]{trace << "JWT: " << jwt;}); } catch (const system_error& e) { error << "unable to generate JWT (errno=" << e.code () << "): " << e; return nullopt; } return jwt; } // There are three types of GitHub API authentication: // // 1) Authenticating as an app. Used to access parts of the API concerning // the app itself such as getting the list of installations. (Need to // authenticate as an app as part of authenticating as an app // installation.) // // 2) Authenticating as an app installation (on a user or organisation // account). Used to access resources belonging to the user/repository // or organisation the app is installed in. // // 3) Authenticating as a user. Used to perform actions as the user. // // We need to authenticate as an app installation (2). // // How to authenticate as an app installation // // Reference: // https://docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/authenticating-with-a-github-app/authenticating-as-a-github-app-installation // // The final authentication token we need is an installation access token // (IAT), valid for one hour, which we will pass in the `Authentication` // header of our Github API requests: // // Authorization: Bearer // // To generate an IAT: // // - Generate a JSON Web Token (JWT) // // - Get the installation ID. This will be included in the webhook request // in our case // // - Send a POST to /app/installations//access_tokens which // includes the JWT (`Authorization: Bearer `). The response will // include the IAT. Can pass the name of the repository included in the // webhook request to restrict access, otherwise we get access to all // repos covered by the installation if installed on an organisation for // example. // optional ci_github:: obtain_installation_access_token (uint64_t iid, string jwt, const basic_mark& error) const { gh_installation_access_token iat; try { // API endpoint. // string ep ("app/installations/" + to_string (iid) + "/access_tokens"); uint16_t sc ( github_post (iat, ep, strings {"Authorization: Bearer " + jwt})); // Possible response status codes from the access_tokens endpoint: // // 201 Created // 401 Requires authentication // 403 Forbidden // 404 Resource not found // 422 Validation failed, or the endpoint has been spammed. // // Note that the payloads of non-201 status codes are undocumented. // if (sc != 201) { error << "unable to get installation access token: error HTTP " << "response status " << sc; return nullopt; } // Create a clock drift safety window. // iat.expires_at -= chrono::minutes (5); } catch (const json::invalid_json_input& e) { // Note: e.name is the GitHub API endpoint. // error << "malformed JSON in response from " << e.name << ", line: " << e.line << ", column: " << e.column << ", byte offset: " << e.position << ", error: " << e; return nullopt; } catch (const invalid_argument& e) { error << "malformed header(s) in response: " << e; return nullopt; } catch (const system_error& e) { error << "unable to get installation access token (errno=" << e.code () << "): " << e.what (); return nullopt; } return iat; } }